William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 1

Article 11

2011

Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and
Intellectual Origins
Jonathon W. Penney

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Penney, Jonathon W. (2011) "Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and Intellectual Origins," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 38:
Iss. 1, Article 11.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Penney: Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and Intellectual Origins

INTERNET ACCESS RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY AND
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
Jonathon W. Penney †
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................ 11
II. INTERNET ACCESS RIGHTS: TWO THREADS OF THOUGHT....... 15
A. Cyber-Libertarianism ........................................................... 16
B. The International “Right to Communicate” .......................... 18
III. THE RIGHT TO SEEK, RECEIVE, AND IMPART INFORMATION .... 20
A. The Special Rapporteur’s Findings and Article 19(2) ............ 20
B. History and Origins ............................................................ 21
1. The Free Flow of Information Paradigm .......................... 21
a. The Free Flow Principle and Freedom of
Information as Foundational to Other Freedoms ........ 23
b. The Importance of the Means of Communication—
Particularly Mass Communications—to Freedom
of Information, and State Obligations to Promote
Them ...................................................................... 27
2. The Free Flow of Information Paradigm and the
Origins of the Right to Seek, Receive, and Impart
Information................................................................... 30
3. A New Competing Paradigm .......................................... 34
IV. READING THE REPORT IN LIGHT OF THE FREE FLOW OF
INFORMATION PARADIGM ........................................................ 38
V. INTERNET RIGHTS: FUTURE DIRECTIONS ................................ 41

† Visiting Researcher and Policy Fellow, Citizen Lab, Munk School of
Global Affairs, University of Toronto and Doctoral Research Fellow, Balliol
College, University of Oxford. Aspects of this article are based on a working paper
presented as a lecture at Victoria University (Wellington) in 2010. The author
would like to thank Brian Bender for the invitation to contribute to this special
edition, as well as the various William Mitchell Law Review editors for comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts. He would also like to thank Greg Lastowka for his
helpful advice in putting these ideas in print.

10

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 11

2011]

INTERNET ACCESS RIGHTS

I.

11

INTRODUCTION

Promoting Internet freedom and resisting legal or
technological forms of control has long been a cause célèbre among
1
lawyers and cyberlaw scholars. On the one hand, the Internet and
its related technologies, it was thought, may hold “limitless”
potential for new forms of individualism, self-determination, and
2
“social progress.” On the other hand, it may also spur new
technologies of control, censorship, and surveillance, where
3
freedom and privacy are threatened. In one future there is great
liberty; in another, a great threat to it.
Yet, the running assumption in both of these scenarios is that
people, for good or ill, will be connected to the Internet, and in
increasing numbers. Is this a sound premise today? Does not fast
1. Early “cyber-libertarian” writers like John Perry Barlow argued that
“cyberspace” was beyond the control and reach of both governments and industry.
See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/DeclarationFinal.html, reprinted in CRYPTO ANARCHY, CYBERSTATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS 28
(Peter Ludlow ed., 2001); JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006). Following this lead, much of
early cyberlaw scholarship argued that traditional laws ought not apply to
cyberspace and virtual worlds. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And
How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized,
Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62, 65 (Brian Kahin & James H.
Keller eds., 1997) (arguing for a decentralized system of Internet governance); I.
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993,
1015–25 (1994) (advocating self-help, custom, and contract to regulate
cyberspace); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1387–91 (1996) (noting possibilities of internal
regulation of the Internet through competing rule sets); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 419 (1997) (contending that as a general rule “selfgovernance is desirable for electronic communities”); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 912–17 (1996)
(arguing that attempts to define rules for the development of cyberspace “rely on
disintegrating concepts of territory and sector, while ignoring the new network
and technological borders that transcend national boundaries”); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998) (arguing for a “Lex Informatica,” which
would regulate cyberspace through technological devices); Symposium, Governing
Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 161 (1996) (arguing for metaphor of cyberspace
as separate space).
2. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE
INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW xi
(1999).
3. Id.
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and stable Internet connectivity remain a privilege for wealthy
citizens living in wealthy states? And what if governments around
the world take measures to block connectivity in a bid to suppress
the destabilizing effects that the Internet, and the ideas it can
quickly disseminate, can have on social or political order? This is
not merely academic. If there is anything we have learned from
recent protest movements, including the so-called “Arab Spring,”
and heavy-handed government efforts to block, censor, suspend,
and manipulate connectivity, it is that Internet access is anything
4
but certain, especially when governments feel threatened.
Despite these cold realities and hard truths about connectivity,
the notion that people have a “right” to Internet access gained
high-profile international recognition this year. In a report to the
United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly earlier this year (the
Report), the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression,
Frank La Rue, held that Internet access should be recognized as a
5
human right. The finding garnered much international attention
6
and acclaim. But at the same time, there has yet been very little
4. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L.
& TECH. J. 213, 223 (2003) (“States cannot ignore, and are likely to pursue,
additional means of enforcement through intermediaries or proxies. Various
points in the network infrastructure serve as gateways that in effect re-centralize
access to the Internet. These gateways might be access providers, hosting services,
or major switching hubs that are located within the jurisdiction of the interested
state. The existence of these gateway points in an otherwise decentralized network
entices states to focus efforts and find enforcement mechanisms that operate
through the intermediaries at these points.”); Sahar Khamis & Katherine Vaughn,
Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism
Tilted the Balance, ARAB MEDIA & SOC’Y, Summer 2011, available at
http://www.arabmediasociety.org/articles/downloads/20110603105609_Khamis.p
df (describing former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s effort to quell
protesters by shutting down the Internet for nearly a week); Jillian C. York, Policing
Content in the Quasi-Public Sphere, OPENNET INITIATIVE BULL., 4–5 (2010),
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/PolicingContent.pdf (citing Internet
surveillance and censorship in such countries as China and Iran).
5. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends
and Challenges to the Right of all Individuals to Seek, Receive and Impart Information and
Ideas of All Kinds Through the Internet, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur] (by Frank La
Rue).
6. See, e.g., At the Crossroads of Globalization: Access to the Internet is Now a
Human Right, THE MAJALLA (June 9, 2011), http://www.majalla.com/eng/2011/06
/article3548; Matthew Davis, Internet Access a Human Right?, JAKARTAGLOBE (July 12,
2011),
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/bytethis/internet-access-a-humanright/452356; The Current: Internet Access as a Human Right, CBCRADIO (June 9,
2011), http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/episode/2011/06/09/internet-access-as-ahuman-right; Internet as a Human Right: Not Just a Wishful Thinking, TFM&A INDIA
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systematic study of the Report, and the ideas about rights set out
therein. This article aims to change this.
After all, this clear international recognition for Internet rights
by a report tabled before the U.N. General Assembly raises some
important questions. Where did these ideas arise from? Did they
arise as a product of the technological changes of the times, or is
there a broader evolution of ideas that might give some sense of
their future direction? Comprehensive answers to these questions
would take us far beyond the scope of this article; I will,
nevertheless, aim to at least provide the first steps, or a foundation,
for proper answers. Taking the Report as my focus, I trace the
history and intellectual origins behind the Report’s key findings on
Internet access rights, linking the notion of Internet rights to a
broader international and political context of evolving ideas about
expression, information, and communication. This context will, I
hope, tell us something not just about where these ideas came
from, but their future movement too.
Indeed, the Report was not the first legal or institutional
recognition of such ideas. In fact, ideas about “rights” to Internet
access have slowly gained momentum around the world in recent
7
years. In May 2009, the French parliament passed a new online
(June 10, 2011), http://tfmaindia.com/internet-as-a-human-right-not-just-awishful-thinking; Robin Hicks, Should Internet Access Be a Basic Human Right?, ASIA
PAC. FUTUREGOV (July 6, 2011), http://www.futuregov.asia/articles/2010/jul/06
/should-internet-access-be-basic-human-right; David Kravets, U.N. Report Declares
Internet Access a Human Right, WIRED (June 3, 2011, 2:47 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/internet-a-human-right; Dave Lee,
Should Internet Users Ever Be Cut Off?, BBC (June 11, 2011, 01:39 UK),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/9509215.stm;
Nathan
Olivarez-Giles, United Nations Report: Internet Access is a Human Right, LOS ANGELES
TIMES TECH. BLOG (June 3, 2011, 6:42 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com
/technology/2011/06/united-nations-report-internet-access-is-a-humanright.html; Nidhi Subbaraman, UN Report: Internet Access is a Basic Human Right,
TECHNOLOG ON MSNBC.COM (June 3, 2011, 6:40 PM), http://
technolog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/06/03/6781285-un-report-internetaccess-is-a-basic-human-right; United Nations: Disconnecting People from the Internet Is a
Violation of Human Rights, AUSTRALIANPOLICYONLINE (June 15, 2011),
http://www.apo.org.au/research/united-nations-disconnecting-people-internetviolation-human-rights; United Nations: Internet Access Is a Human Right,
DUBAICHRONICLE (June 7, 2011), http://www.dubaichronicle.com
/2011/06/07/united-nations-internet-access-is-a-human-right; United Nations report:
Internet Access Is a Human Right, ETHIOPIAN REV. (June 3, 2011, 9:42 PM),
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/20111/415708; UN Names Internet Access
‘Basic Human Right’, VOICE OF RUSSIA (June 7, 2011, 10:55 Moscow Time),
http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/06/07/51381532.html.
7. And, past scholarship has, elsewhere, discussed the Internet in the
context of human rights. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNET (Steven
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copyright infringement law known as HADOPI, which gave power
to a government agency to cut off people’s Internet access for
8
repeated copyright infringement. A month later, the country’s
Conseil Constitutionnel, or national constitutional court, found
this power to cut off Internet connectivity an unconstitutional
restriction on citizens’ right to “freedom of expression and
9
In October 2009, the Finnish government
communication.”
passed a law making it a “right” not only for its citizens to have
Internet access,
but
that
the
service
provided by
telecommunications companies must offer connectivity speeds of at
10
least one megabit-per-second (Mbps). And in New Zealand, back
in 2008, Internet access was likened to a basic human right by key
11
government officials.
These instances may suggest a broader trend, but might also
be seen as simply a handful of countries experimenting with
different notions of Internet rights.
Indeed, among these
examples, there was no clear recognition for such ideas from a
high level international body or high profile official. None, that is,
until the Report, the focus of this article.
My discussion is divided into several sections. In section II, I
provide some preliminary thoughts on some threads of intellectual
thought that likely influenced the ideas in the Report. In section
III, I turn my focus to the history and intellectual origins of the
Hick et al. eds., 2000). But often these works take a more conservative approach,
avoiding the claim that Internet access should be conceived as a fundamental
right. See Michael L. Best, Can the Internet Be a Human Right?, 4 HUM. RTS. & HUM.
WELFARE 23, 24 (2004).
8. French Online Copyright Infringement Law Faces Challenges but May Create
Business Opportunities, TELECOMM., MEDIA & ENT. UPDATE (Hogan & Hartson LLP,
D.C.), 1 (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/files
/Publication/b3773467-7d3c-4d28-8546-be4e4952fba9/Presentation
/PublicationAttachment/51918c8f-410b-4d7c-89c1-c40a85947978/TME
_May2109.pdf.
9. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009580DC, June 10, 2009, J.O. 9675 (Fr.), translated in Act Furthering the Diffusion and
Protection of Creation on the Internet, Décision n° 2009-580, 4 (June 10, 2009),
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm
/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf.
10. Saeed Ahmed, Fast Internet Access Becomes a Legal Right in Finland, CNN
(October 15, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/15
/finland.internet.rights/index.html.
11. Judith Tizard, the former Minister of Justice in New Zealand, suggested
Internet connectivity was a basic human right. Government Wavers on Web Cut-offs,
STUFF.CO.NZ, http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/it-telcos/644613 (“Judith is of
the mind that Internet access is almost a human right now, similar to water and
electricity.”) (last updated Sept. 25, 2008).
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right to “seek, receive, and impart information,” which constitutes
the central basis for the Report. After setting out that history, I
read the Report in light of this history in section IV and briefly set
out some directions forward in section V. For greater clarity before
moving on, when I say “Internet,” I mean the global system of
public and private “electronics, computers, and communication
networks” all connected and linked via the same basic architecture,
12
the Internet’s TCP/IP protocol. My use is largely consistent with
popular understandings of the term, but will range from more
popular components of the Internet, like the World Wide Web, to
those components, or services, growing in popularity, like cloudcomputing.
II. INTERNET ACCESS RIGHTS: TWO THREADS OF THOUGHT
What does a “right” to Internet access mean? Presumably, this
means someone has the right to connect to the Internet without
any kind of state interference with that right of access. But this
simple explanation masks more complex issues, like whether such a
right is not only negative, that is, it protects against government
intrusion, but also imposes positive obligations on a state or
government to provide Internet access, or a certain kind of access.
The Special Rapporteur examined Internet access rights in both
senses, not only talking about people’s freedom to access Internet
13
content, but also state obligations to provide access to the physical
14
Though, the
infrastructure necessary for Internet connectivity.
Report (and I will say more on this later) spends much more time
on the former notion of Internet access rights, setting out ways that
states are restricting access to the Internet, and its content,
including filtering, censoring, criminalization of expression,
15
intermediary liability, and cyber-attacks.
These two aspects of Internet rights, their negative and positive
components, have many different intellectual origins, not the least
16
of which is political philosophy and rights theory more generally.
12. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1195 (1998).
13. Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 9–16.
14. Id. at 16–19.
15. The Report recommendations demonstrate this too, providing several
more recommendations on the former, compared to the latter. See id. at 19–22.
16. Twentieth century political philosopher Isaiah Berlin famously
distinguished between the “negative” and “positive” notions of liberty in the
history of political philosophy and rights theory. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of
Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 121 (1969).
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But there are also more current threads of thought, tied more
closely to Internet scholarship that should be examined to
understand the broader findings of the Report. I examine them
next.
Modern notions of a right to Internet access owe themselves to
two more recent threads of intellectual thought: cyberlibertarianism and the “right to communicate.” This section
discusses both of these in some detail.
A. Cyber-Libertarianism
Freedom, liberty, and the uniqueness of “cyberspace” were
heralded by the first generation of the Internet’s thinkers, writers,
and intellectuals—the cyber-libertarians and “information-age
luminaries” like John Parry Barlow, Alvin Toffler, George Gilder,
and Esther Dyson, whose thinking helped forge the early
17
intellectual foundations for theorizing the Internet experience.
These ideals and ideas were, says Lawrence Lessig, the “founding
18
values of the Net.”
These “founding values” received much attention from tech
writers and cyberlaw scholars in the 1990s. In his famous A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Barlow proclaimed that
he spoke with “no greater authority than that with which liberty
19
itself always speaks.” Lessig’s influential Code as Law explained
that the “challenge for our generation” is to “protect liberty” in
20
cyberspace in the face of “architectures of control.” And Yochai
Benkler’s similarly popular The Wealth of Networks explores concepts
21
First generation cyberlaw scholarship,
of human freedom.
influenced by these ideas, thus offered innovative ways to preserve
liberty, self-government, and autonomy in cyberspace from
22
coercion.
Given the uniqueness and importance these thinkers
17. NICK DYER-WITHEFORD, CYBER-MARX: CYCLES AND CIRCUITS OF STRUGGLE IN
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CAPITALISM 34 (1999); FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE TO
CYBERCULTURE: STEWART BRAND, THE WHOLE EARTH NETWORK, AND THE RISE OF
DIGITAL UTOPIANISM 261 (2006).
18. Lawrence Lessig, quoted in Wen Stephenson, The Values of Code (and Code):
An Email Exchange with Lawrence Lessig, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (Dec. 13, 1999),
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/digicult/lessig.htm.
19. Barlow, supra note 1, at 28.
20. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 xv (2006).
21. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
22. See sources cited supra note 1.
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attributed to the “cyberspace” experience and the new possibilities
offered by the Internet, it is not surprising that one of the first
modern expressions of a “right” or “freedom” of Internet
connectivity emerged within this 1990s intellectual paradigm. In a
1997 piece entitled “Freedom to Connect” published in Wired
Magazine, Leila Conners wrote that “[a]n essential component of
the emerging global culture is the ability and freedom to connect—
23
to anyone, anytime, anywhere, for anything.”
Before going further into the substance of Conners’s piece, it
is worthwhile noting a few things about the place of publication.
Wired Magazine was very influential in the 1990s among those
interested in the Internet and related communication technology;
24
The magazine, for example,
it was the “Bible of Cyberspace.”
described itself as a “journal of record for the future” that “speaks
not just to high-tech professionals and the business savvy, but also
to the forward-looking, the culturally astute, and the simply
25
curious.”
So, Wired Magazine was not just a mouthpiece for the cyberlibertarian writers—that would be an oversimplification; the
magazine, after all, aimed to speak to more than just the
information technology community, but also broad social and
26
Still, Wired Magazine’s editorial line generally
political events.
followed the same optimism about technology and the “new forms
27
of social interaction and community” that the Internet offered.
That an article heralding a “right” or “freedom” to connect to the
Internet appeared in its pages, then, is consistent with the broader
intellectual currents in which Wired was situated, particularly
throughout the 1990s.
Conners, though having a background in international politics
and policy, was also familiar with the potential of media and
28
technology. A year before publishing her piece, she founded a
multimedia group called Tree Media, which “creates” media to
29
Her piece, interestingly,
“support and sustain civil society.”
23. Leila Conners, Freedom to Connect, WIRED MAGAZINE, Aug. 1997, at 106.
24. SHEILA STEINBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES 280
(2007).
25. Wired description as reprinted in DAVID BELL ET AL., CYBERCULTURE: THE
KEY CONCEPTS 191 (2004).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. About Leila Conners, TREE MEDIA GROUP, http://www.treemedia.com
/treemedia.com/Leila.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
29. Id.
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combined a kind of internationalism with optimism about
technology and the Internet. It heralded a “freedom to connect”
not as a right in the period in which she was writing, but that might
be recognized and affirmed in the future:
Someday this freedom may be seen as a basic human
right, very closely aligned with the right of free speech.
But while the freedom to connect is fairly widespread
today, its foundations are shaky. As more nations grapple
with the politics of connectivity, the liberty to log on may
30
diminish.
Along with her discussion, Conners included a two page map of the
world, which indicated the level of Internet censorship and
31
regulation across different countries.
Interestingly, Conners offers no thoughts on the obligation of
states to provide Internet access. Instead, she speaks of it as a
“basic human right” and connects it to free speech, saying the two
32
She also brings an internationalist
ideas are closely related.
perspective, emphasizing the need to be vigilant about guarding
these things not just in the United States, but also elsewhere in the
33
All of these ideas follow the cyber-libertarian line:
world.
emphasizing liberty and the need to prevent states from regulating
and interfering with the Internet. Many of these themes, as we
shall see later, are apparent in more contemporary conceptions of
the Internet as a basic right or freedom.
B. The International “Right to Communicate”
A second line of thought relevant to the intellectual origins of
modern ideas of Internet access rights is one Conners may have
also drawn on, given her background in international politics and
policy. That is, the movement, also in the 1980s and early 1990s,
was for international recognition of a “right to communicate.”
Though the idea of a “right to communicate” was articulated
as early as 1969 by the late U.N. official Jean d’Arcy (who believed
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) would one
day recognize such a right), it did not gain momentum until the
mid-1980s among certain international institutions like U.N.
34
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, or UNESCO.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Conners, supra note 23, at 106.
Id. at 106–107.
Id. at 106.
Id.
CEES J. HAMELINK, THE POLITICS
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In 1980, UNESCO brought the idea of a “right to communicate” to
the international stage when its General Conference in Belgrade
passed a resolution recognizing it as a “right of the public, of ethnic
and social groups and of individuals to have access to information
35
sources and to participate actively in the communication process.”
UNESCO also recognized the idea in subsequent resolutions in
1981 and 1983, and in 1985 UNESCO consultants prepared a
36
“status report” on the right.
However, by the early 1990s, international interest in the idea
began to wane. UNESCO showed less inclination to promote the
37
And subsequent efforts by other
idea in subsequent meetings.
international organizations and officials to take up the cause had
38
The movement to codify communication rights
little success.
internationally ultimately failed to gain traction for a number of
reasons, not the least of which was that the rights, so expressed and
advocated by these institutions, implied a kind of international
obligation to provide a means for people to communicate that
states in either the First or Third Worlds had neither the resources
39
nor will to support or subsidize.
However, the notion of a “right to communicate” is clearly
relevant to more recent Internet access rights claims, given the
latter’s centrality in modern forms of interaction and global
communication. Indeed, such claims for communication rights
cleared the path for early insistence on the importance of access to
the Internet and other information and communications
technology (ICT), like the “Declaration of Principles” issued at the
2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a summit
40
convened by the U.N. Secretary General. In addition to affirming
that “[c]ommunication is a fundamental social process,” the
Declaration also proclaimed a “commitment to build a peoplecentred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society,
where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 293–98 (1994).
35. UNESCO Res. 4/19, Recs. of the General Conference, 21st Sess., Vol. 1,
Sept. 23–Oct. 28, 1980 at 69, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140
/114029e.pdf; HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 297.
36. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 297.
37. Id. at 298.
38. Id. at 297–300.
39. Karol Jakubowicz, The Right to Public Expression: A Modest Proposal for an
Important Human Right, MEDIAPOLICY.ORG, 4–5 (2010), http://mediapolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/right-to-freedom-of-expression1.pdf.
40. Best, supra note 7, at 24.
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41

and knowledge.” Insisting on the social, cultural, and economic
importance of ICT access is only a degree removed from insisting
on Internet access as a “right” for similar reasons. Thus, the WSIS
has today become a forum for groups like the Association of
Progressive Communications, who go beyond the 2003 principles
42
in advocating for universal Internet access.
The “right to communicate” also attempted to build on earlier
entrenched international recognition for both free expression and
43
freedom of information. But it was largely unsuccessful in gaining
any lasting traction in the world community, so it thus offers a
44
lesson of caution for Internet rights advocates. But, as the next
section will show, the failure of the communication rights
movement is not the end of the story for Internet access rights.
III. THE RIGHT TO SEEK, RECEIVE, AND IMPART INFORMATION
Having given some preliminary background, both intellectual
and legal-historical, for ideas about Internet access rights, I want to
focus more specifically on the Special Rapporteur’s central legal
foundation for his conception: the right to “seek, receive and
45
impart information.”
A. The Special Rapporteur’s Findings and Article 19(2)
Indeed, in the Report’s summary this right is mentioned in the
very first line and given importance first and foremost in relation to
46
It is mentioned several times throughout the
the Internet.
document and, again, at the very outset of the Report’s
47
recommendations. The source that the Special Rapporteur cites

41. World Summit on the Information Society: Geneva Declaration of
Principles, ITU (Dec. 10–12, 2003), http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official
/dop.html.
42. APC… on Internet Governance, ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE COMM., http://
www.apc.org/en/blog/apc-internet-governance (speaking of APC’s advocacy at
the WSIS, and affirming its commitment to “[e]nsuring internet access is universal
and affordable”) (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
43. Jakubowicz, supra note 39, at 4 (discussing how the “right to
communicate” movement failed because its advocates failed to offer a means by
which states could turn the right to freedom of expression into a “positive” right
that would impose obligations on states to “give them the tools of public
expression”).
44. Id. at 2, 4.
45. Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1, 4, 7, 10, 19.
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for this right is Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil
Political Rights (ICCPR): “Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through
48
any other media of his choice.”
So, understanding the Report’s finding concerning Internet
access rights, which is based on the “right to seek, receive and
49
impart information and ideas,” requires understanding the legal
and historical context underlying the language of the right, which
is drawn from Article 19(2) of the ICCPR. In other words, the
history and origins of the former are no doubt informed by those
of the latter.
In this section, I trace the origins and history of this language,
which basically codifies a broader international legal paradigm
concerning freedom of information and expression: the Free Flow
of Information Paradigm. The origins of the Free Flow of
Information Paradigm in international law and politics go back to
at least the Second World War, when the movement to adopt
50
international covenants and bills of rights gained momentum.
The right to “seek, receive and impart information,” codified in the
UDHR and ICCPR and re-invoked in the Report, emerged from
within this paradigm. I set out this history in the next section.
B. History and Origins
1.

The Free Flow of Information Paradigm

Freedom of information and expression “figured prominently”
in Post-War efforts to draft international covenants and bills of
51
rights. This was due in large part to American influence and its
48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
49. Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 1, 4.
50. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 152.
51. Id.; see also id. at 153 (describing subsequent treaties and efforts aimed at
freedom of information); K. Venkata Raman, Towards a New World Information and
Communication Order: Problems of Access and Cultural Development, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1027, 1035–36
(Ronald St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); PHILIP M. TAYLOR,
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE MEDIA SINCE 1945, at
30–31 (1997); Muhammad I. Ayish, International Communication in the 1990s:
Implications for the Third World, 68 INT’L AFF. 487, 490 (1992); Fred H. Cate, The First
Amendment and the “Free Flow” of Information, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 371, 373–74 (1990);
Marian Koren, Human Rights of Children: Their Right to Information, 2 HUM. RTS. REV.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/11

12

Penney: Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and Intellectual Origins

22

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

52

allies in the West. Spurred on by the U.S. Congress and the First
Amendment values of the growing American media—that a free
press and free exchange in the “marketplace of ideas” was essential
to determining truth and preserving other fundamental rights—
freedom of information became a key element of U.S. foreign
53
Of course, media and
policy in the 1940s and 1950s.
newsgathering was essential to this project, given its role in
54
Indeed,
transmitting information and ideas around the world.
newspapers and other media groups also promoted these ideas
55
abroad. For example, as early as 1945, the American Society of
Newspaper Editors travelled to various countries to promote the
“unrestricted” free exchange of ideas and information around the
56
world, which it called the “free flow doctrine.”
But this new international focus on freedom of information
was not just a product of American influence; it also had to do with
the difficult challenges facing the world community in the Post-War
period. Two central issues for a world community that was warweary and longing for peace and stability were war propaganda and
57
War propaganda was used extensively in the
state censorship.
First World War and that use only intensified in the Second World
War with the rise of mass media, particularly propaganda via
58
shortwave radio. And as governments used propaganda on their
own citizens to ensure national support for war efforts and on
foreign countries for psychological warfare, they also took steps to
censor both national and foreign media—radio frequency
“jamming” of international broadcasts was used by many countries
59
If the Post-War world community was serious
during the war.
about keeping, preserving, and promoting peace, they would have
to do something to address these problems.
The consensus solution, successfully promoted internationally
by the United States and its Western allies at the U.N. and its newly
created agencies, was to promote the free and unrestricted flow of

54, 60–61 (2001).
52. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 153.
53. Id. at 153–54; Ayish, supra note 51, at 490; Cate, supra note 51, at 373–74;
Koren, supra note 51, at 54.
54. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 152.
55. Id. at 152–53.
56. Id. at 152.
57. Id. at 136, 151; Raman, supra note 51, at 1035.
58. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 137.
59. Id.
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60

information and ideas globally. The idea was that guaranteeing
this would address both issues at once: opposing media restrictions
and state censorship would also resolve the problem of war
propaganda, as the diversity of expression, ideas, and opinions
ensured by the flow of information across borders would render
61
propaganda ineffective.
The consensus that a “free flow” of ideas would best battle war
propaganda and censorship reflected this broader Post-War Free
Flow of Information Paradigm, which emphasized the unrestricted
62
In this
international flow of information and expression.
paradigm of international law and politics, freedom of information
was promoted not simply as a means to fight war propaganda and
censorship, but as a foundational right in and of itself, linked to
other important rights, freedoms, and interests, like free
63
expression, progress, and peace.
a. The Free Flow Principle and Freedom of Information as
Foundational to Other Freedoms
There were a few ideas or principles important to this
Paradigm. The first was the idea that freedom of information was a
foundational freedom and essential to promoting other important
rights, interests, and freedoms, like free expression, progress, and
64
65
peace. The second key idea was the “Free Flow” principle, which
followed logically from the first principle. The Free Flow principle
mandated that the free and unrestricted flow of information across
66
Both of
borders and around the world should be maximized.
60. Id. at 153; Altaf Gauhar, Free Flow of Information: Myths and Shibboleths, 1
THIRD WORLD Q. 53, 55 (1979).
61. See John B. Whitton, The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information
and the Movement Against International Propaganda, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 74 (1949)
(describing attending the Conference).
62. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 153; see also Jan Servaes, Communication and
Development Paradigms: An Overview, in COMMUNICATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
ANTHOLOGY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 283, 286–87 (Alfonso
Gumucio-Dagron & Thomas Tufte eds., 2006) (discussing the infusion of western
ideals regarding freedom of information into the Post-War Freedom of
Information Paradigm); Cate, supra note 51, at 373−74. See generally ACHAL MEHRA,
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION: A NEW PARADIGM (Greenwood Press, Inc. 1986)
(describing the history and barriers of the international free flow of information).
63. Koren, supra note 51, at 54–55.
64. Id.
65. I borrow this nomenclature from Herbert I. Schiller. See Herbert I.
Schiller, The Genesis of the Free Flow of Information Principle, in CRISIS IN
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 161 (Jim Richstad & Michael H. Anderson eds., 1981).
66. Koren, supra note 51, at 54, 60.
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these ideas or principles are apparent in Resolution 59(I), the
U.N.’s first declaration on Freedom of Information, which was
adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly in its very first
session in 1946:
Freedom of information is a fundamental human
right and is the touchstone of all freedoms to which the
United Nations is consecrated;
Freedom of information implies the right to gather,
transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere
without fetters. As such it is an essential factor in
any
serious effort to promote the peace and progress of the
67
world . . . .
Freedom of information is so foundational, the Resolution
declared that it touched all fundamental freedoms recognized by
68
the U.N. And, following from this, freedom of information must
be guaranteed, including the “right” to “gather,” “transmit,” and
69
“publish” news “anywhere” freely and “without fetters.”
In order to follow up on these declarations, that same
resolution also announced an intention “to authorize the holding
of a conference of all Members of the United Nations on freedom
70
of information.”
These two principles were also apparent in UNESCO’s
founding constitution of 1945. UNESCO was founded as the
U.N.’s “principal arm” to carry out the aims of security and peace
71
in the U.N. Charter, and its constitution states:
[Signatory states] believing in full and equal opportunities
for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of
objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and
knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to
increase the means of communication between their
peoples and to employ these means for the purpose of
mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect
72
knowledge of each other’s lives.
Again, freedom of information and the “free exchange of ideas and
67. Declaration on Freedom of Information, G.A. Res. 59 (I), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/1 (Dec. 14, 1946); HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 153; TAYLOR, supra note
51, at 30–31.
68. Declaration on Freedom of Information, supra note 67.
69. Id.
70. EDWARD H. LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 536 (Mary Lou
Bertucci et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996).
71. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 30–31.
72. UNESCO’S CONSTITUTION (1945), reprinted in TAYLOR, supra note 51, at
30–31 (alteration in original).
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knowledge” are to be promoted as they are linked to other
fundamental goals and interests including “objective truth” and
73
Following its constitution, a special
“mutual understanding.”
section was created in UNESCO’s Mass Communication Division to
74
deal with the “free flow of information.”
Subsequently, two international agreements were concluded
under the “auspices” of UNESCO, which promote international
75
circulation of cultural, scientific, and educational materials.
These included the Agreement for Facilitating the International
Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Character, signed December 10, 1948; and
the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and
76
Cultural Materials, Lake Success, signed November 22, 1950.
Again, each agreement promotes the freer flow of information and
cultural materials.
These ideas appear again and again. Pursuant to the 1946
U.N. General Assembly Resolution noted above, the U.N.
Conference on Freedom of Information (the Conference) was
convened in Geneva in 1948 by the U.N. Economic and Social
77
78
Fifty-four countries participated in the Conference.
Council.
The “major objective” of the Conference, reflected in Resolution
59(I), was “the improvement in the means of sending information
across frontiers in accordance with the view, solemnly affirmed by
the Conference, that freedom of information is a fundamental
79
human right . . . .”
The Conference issued a number of resolutions and authored
80
three draft conventions on freedom of information. The very first
73. Id.
74. Gauhar, supra note 60, at 55.
75. Egon Schwelb, International Conventions on Human Rights, 9 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 654, 662 n.24 (1960) (“The Agreement of 1948 is in force among 14 States.
It has been signed, but not ratified, by eight. The Agreement of 1950 is in force
among 33 States. It has been signed, but not ratified, by 9.”).
76. Id.
77. LAWSON, supra note 70, at 536.
78. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, Mar. 23–Apr. 21, 1948,
Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.6/79, App. I [hereinafter U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information]
(listing the delegations attending); HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 153. See Zechariah
Chafee Jr., Legal Problems of Freedom of Information in the United States, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 547 (1949) (describing the sessions in the Sub-Commission
and at the Conference).
79. As described by John B. Whitton, who attended the Conference. See
Whitton, supra note 61, at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C,
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resolution issued, Resolution No. 1, affirmed the following General
Principles:
Freedom of information is a fundamental human right of
the people, and is the touchstone of all freedoms to which
the United Nations is dedicated, without which world
peace cannot well be preserved; and
Freedom of information carries the right to gather,
transmit, and disseminate news anywhere and everywhere
without fetters; and
Freedom of information depends for its validity upon
the availability to the people of a diversity of sources of
news and of opinion; and
Freedom of information further depends upon the
willingness of the press and other agencies of information
to employ the privileges derived from the people without
abuse, and to accept and comply with the obligations to
seek the facts without prejudice and to spread knowledge
81
without malicious intent . . . .
It was also at the Conference that freedom of information was
82
linked more clearly to freedom of expression and opinion, which
was a logical connection given that press freedom and the free
exchange of ideas requires free expression as much as a free flow of
information, expression, and ideas. Thus, the draft Convention on
Freedom of Information issued by the Conference’s Final Act,
declared “that the free interchange of information and opinions,
both in the national and in the international sphere, is a
83
fundamental human right”; Conference Resolution No. 28 hailed
“free interchange of information and opinions promotes the welfare
84
of all nations and is indispensable to the peace of the world”; and
Resolution No. 26, which dealt with “Measures Concerning the
Free Publication and Reception of Information” recommended:
[T]hat States should from time to time review their laws of
libel, taking into consideration the general conclusions of
this Conference, in order to remove anomalies, and to
secure to all persons the maximum freedom of expression
ch. I, Res. No. 1–6; HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 154.
81. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C,
ch. I, Res. No. 1.
82. Id. at Annex A, Draft Convention on Freedom of Information (“[T]he
free interchange of information and opinions, both in the national and in the
international sphere, is a fundamental human right . . . .”).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at Annex C, ch. III, Res. No. 28.
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compatible with the maintenance of order and with due
85
regard to the rights of others . . . .
And, returning to the free flow principle—which embodies the
importance of freedom of information and expression—Resolution
No. 2, which concerned the challenge of war propaganda,
affirmed:
Whereas the attainment of a just and lasting peace
depends in great degree upon the free flow of true and
honest information to all peoples and upon the spirit of
responsibility with which all personnel of the press and
other agencies of information seek the truth and report
86
the facts . . . .
These principles reflected the ideas of the U.N.’s General Assembly
Resolution 59(I): emphasizing, again, how freedom of information
is connected to other important “freedoms,” and the resolve to
87
promote the unrestricted dissemination of information.
b. The Importance of the Means of Communication—
Particularly Mass Communications—to Freedom of Information,
and State Obligations to Promote Them
However, there is another recurring idea or principle of the
Free Flow of Information Paradigm that is implied or is apparent in
this resolution, and other documents, resolutions, and conventions
of the period. That is, the importance of the means by which
information and communications are transmitted; that is, the
importance of information mediums—particularly those providing
mass communications—to freedom of information, and with this,
certain positive obligations states might have to promote the
freedom and accessibility of such media. This is seen in the earlier
Resolution 59(I), which implies the importance of media and
mediums of information, when it spoke of the “right” to “gather,
transmit, and publish news anywhere and everywhere without
88
Publication or transmission of news and information
fetters.”
“anywhere and everywhere” is a function of the mediums of
information (in this case, mass communications)—there must be
some medium through which to transmit, and publish material and
news all over the world.
This same emphasis on the availability and importance of mass
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at Annex C, ch. III, Res. No. 26.
Id. at Annex C, ch. I, Res. No. 2.
See Declaration on Freedom of Information, supra note 67.
Id. ¶ 2.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/11

18

Penney: Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and Intellectual Origins

28

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

communications media is apparent in the Conference Resolution
No. 1, cited just above, discussing the importance of the “Press”
and “other agencies of information” upon which “freedom of
89
information” is dependent. It is also implied in the affirmation
that freedom of information “depends” on the “availability to the
90
people of a diversity of sources of news and of opinion.” Mediums
of information that can reach a broad, even global, audience are
essential to freedom of information.
Given the importance of communications mediums that
transmit news and information, it is not surprising that several
resolutions and conventions issued by the Conference implied or
explicitly required an obligation for states to ensure the freedom of
mass communications media, and, in some cases, take steps to
91
ensure citizens have access to mass media technology. Indeed,
the U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information set down some of
the first “normative standards for the mass media” in its various
92
resolutions.
The Conference, for example, completed a draft Convention
on the Gathering and International Transmission of News, which
affirmed that “Contracting States” desired to “implement the right
of their people to be fully informed” and “improve understanding
between their peoples through the free flow of information and
93
opinion.” Resolution No. 1, already noted and affirmed, among
other things:
That the right of news personnel to have the widest
possible access to the sources of information, to travel
unhampered in pursuit thereof, and to transmit copy
without unreasonable or discriminatory limitations,
should be guaranteed by action on the national and
international plane . . . .
....
That in order to prevent abuses of freedom of
information, governments in so far as they are able should
89. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C,
ch. I, Res. No. 1, pmbl.
90. Id.
91. Cess Hamelink, MacBride with Hindsight, in BEYOND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM:
GLOBALIZATION, COMMUNICATION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 92, 92 n.3
(Peter Golding & Phil Harris eds., 1997).
92. Id.
93. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex A,
Draft Convention on the Gathering and International Transmission of News,
pmbl.
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support measures which will help to improve the quality
of information and to make a diversity of news and
opinion available to the people . . . .
....
That encouragement should be given to the establishment
and to the functioning within the territory of a State of
one or more non-official organizations of persons
employed in the collection and dissemination of
information to the public, and that such organization or
organizations should encourage the fulfilment [sic] inter
alia of the following obligations by all individuals or
organizations engaged in the collection and dissemination
94
of information . . . .
Moreover, Chapter II of the Conference’s Final Act set out a
number of the Conference’s resolutions that specifically addressed
“Measures to Facilitate the Gathering and International
95
Transmission of Information.” This included Resolution No. 13
which set out measures to fight state censorship and also affirmed
positive obligations on states to promote the freedom of mediums
of mass communications. Resolution No. 13 “[s]olemnly condemns
the use in peace-time of censorship which restricts or controls
freedom of information, and [i]nvites Governments to take the
96
necessary steps to promote its progressive abolition . . . .”
Finally, Chapter III of the Conference’s Final Act set out a
number of resolutions that addressed “Measures Concerning the
97
Many of the
Free Publication and Reception of Information.”
resolutions required or recommended that states take certain steps
to promote information flows via “mass media.” For example,
Resolution No. 25 recommended that “all Governments should, to
the extent that they make available materials and facilities for the
mass media, undertake not to discriminate on political or personal
grounds or on the basis of race, nationality, sex, language or
98
religion, or against minorities.”
And Resolution Number 27 recommended:
[T]hat Governments should undertake to put no
obstacles in the way of persons or groups wishing to
94. Id. at Annex C, ch. I, Res. No. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 7.
95. Id. at Annex C, ch. II, Draft Convention on the Gathering and
International Transmission of News, pmbl.
96. Id. at Annex C, ch. II, Res. No. 13.
97. Id. at Annex C, ch. III Draft Convention on the Gathering and
International Transmission of News, pmbl.
98. Id. at Annex C, ch. III, Res. No. 25.
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express themselves through the means of mass
communication, and should ensure insofar as they are
able that persons do not suffer discrimination in the use
of the media on political or personal grounds or on the
99
basis of race, sex, language or religion . . . .
In other words, this third idea or principle—accessible and free
mediums of mass communications and information—is inextricably
linked to the two other principles: that freedom of information is a
“fundamental” freedom and the “Free Flow Principle.” That is, the
promotion of the unrestricted flow of information nationally is a
paramount aim. Though certainly not encapsulating all ideas,
policies, or principles discussed at this time, these three principles
or elements reflected the heart of the Free Flow of Information
Paradigm.
It was from within this very Free Flow of Information Paradigm
that the right to “seek, receive, and impart information” emerged,
100
and found its way into Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19(2)
101
of the ICCPR, two documents central to the drafting and wording
of section 14 itself. The freedom to “seek, receive, and impart
information,” I will show, invokes the key principles and ideas of
the Free Flow of Information Paradigm, and so these principles
constitute some of the key intellectual origins of the concept of
Internet access rights set out in the Report.
2. The Free Flow of Information Paradigm and the Origins of the
Right to Seek, Receive, and Impart Information
The right or freedom to “seek, receive, and impart
information” emerged from within the Free Flow of Information
Paradigm of international law and politics. The U.N.’s Economic
and Social Council established a Commission on Human Rights in
February 1946 with the responsibility to oversee the drafting of an
“international bill of rights” and “international declarations or
covenants” on civil liberties, which would ultimately result in the
102
In early 1947, the
drafting of the UDHR and the ICCPR.
Commission set up a Sub-commission on “Freedom of Information
99. Id. at Annex C, ch. III, Res. No. 27.
100. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1949), at art. 19.
101. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, at
art. 19(2).
102. N.L. GUPTA, CROSSCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 302
(1998); RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY: FROM
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 103 (2006).
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and the Press,” which spent considerable time planning the U.N.
Conference on Freedom of Information that the General Assembly
103
The Commission held off finalizing
had called for in 1946.
language for provisions concerning freedom of expression and
information in both the Declaration of Human Rights (later the
UDHR) and the International Covenant on Human Rights (later
104
the ICCPR) in order to receive input from the Conference.
In fact, the very first international document to use language
reflected in the UDHR and ICCPR was Resolution 59(I), the U.N.’s
1946 declaration on Freedom of Information, which, as already
discussed above, cited the right to “gather, transmit, and
disseminate news anywhere and everywhere without fetters” (an
early permutation of the right to “seek, receive, and impart
information”) in calling for an international conference on
105
This language was later echoed in the
freedom of information.
preamble to the first resolution issued by that conference,
convened in 1948, which recognized that “freedom of information
106
carries the right to gather, transmit, and disseminate . . . .”
However, in the resolution itself, the right was ultimately expressed
in language even closer to that later found in both the UDHR and
ICCPR: “[E]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought and
expression: this shall include freedom to hold opinions without
interference; and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
107
Indeed, two early
by any means and regardless of frontiers . . . .”
drafts of provisions for freedom of expression and information
formulated by the Sub-commission and referred to the Conference
for consideration—one drafted by the British delegation and one
drafted by the United States (by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt herself)—
tracked the language of Resolution 59(I) and the 1948
Conference’s Resolution No. 1:
Draft 2: Draft Proposed by the Representative of the
United States (Mrs. Roosevelt).
Every one shall have the right to freedom of
103. See Declaration on Freedom of Information, supra note 67; Chafee, supra
note 78, at 545.
104. Chafee, supra note 78, at 545; Josef L. Kunz, Freedom of Communications, 49
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 99, 100 (1954).
105. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text (discussing two principles
apparent from the text of the declaration).
106. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C,
ch. I, Res. No. 1, pmbl.
107. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C,
ch. I, Res. No. 1, ¶ 1.
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information, speech and expression.
Every one shall be free to hold his opinion without
molestation, to receive and seek information and the
opinion of others from sources wherever situated, and to
disseminate opinions and information, either by word, in
writing, in the press, in books or by visual, auditive or
108
other means.
The U.S. draft offered no limitations to the right, preferring
109
instead to advocate for one general limitation.
The 1948 Conference on Freedom of Information, in addition
to the numerous draft conventions and resolutions already
discussed, would produce draft provisions for freedom of
information and expression that would ultimately find their way
110
These drafts would also
into both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
incorporate the language of Resolution 59(I), but also include
elements of the sub-commission’s drafts. To say the Conference
draft provisions would prove influential is an understatement. In
fact, the Conference draft provision for “Article 17 and 18” of the
“Draft Declaration on Human Rights” (which would become the
UDHR) would be fully adopted, with little change, as the official
111
Here is a comparison of the
text of the UDHR’s Article 19.
provisions. First, the 1948 Conference Draft: “Everyone shall have
the right to freedom of thought and expression; this right shall
include freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas by any means and
112
And now, the final version of Article 19
regardless of frontiers.”
of the UDHR, which is strikingly similar: “Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
113
The ICCPR’s 1948 Conference draft provisions would
frontiers.”
prove similarly influential, with the ICCPR’s draft for Article 19
closely tracking the language of the 1948 Conference draft
provision. Again, a comparison of the provisions, starting with the
ICCPR 1948 Conference draft:
108.
109.
110.
B.
111.
103.
112.
113.

Chafee, supra note 78, at 581–82, app. I.
Id.
See U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex
Chafee, supra note 78, at 545–46, 581–82, app. I; Kunz, supra note 104, at
Chafee, supra note 78, at 545–46, 581–82, app. I.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 100, at art. 19.
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Every person shall have the right to freedom of thought
and the right to freedom of expression without
interference by governmental action: this right shall
include freedom to hold opinions, to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, by written or printed matter, in the form of
114
art, or by legally operated visual or auditory devices.
And, the final text for Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, again, strikingly
similar:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
115
of art, or through any other media of his choice.
In other words, we can draw a direct line from the ideas and
principles of the 1948 Conference on Freedom of Information to
the final drafts of Article 19 for the UDHR and Article 19 of the
ICCPR, the latter of which was essential to the Report.
In fact, if we return to Article 19 of the UDHR, we can see the
three principles of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm
reflected in its language: “Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
116
frontiers.”
The first principle, which emphasized freedom of information
as a foundational freedom that is inextricably connected to
expression, is clearly reflected in the first two lines, which indicates
that “freedom . . . to seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas” is included in the broader right to “freedom of opinion and
expression.”
The second principle, which emphasized the Free Flow of
Information, is reflected in the language codifying the “freedom”
to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas.” The use of
“seek,” “receive,” and “impart” in unison aptly reflects the multidirectional and communicative nature of information flows that are
free and unrestricted: they are not static, but multi-directional and
provide interactive give-and-take.
114.
115.
19(2).
116.

Chafee, supra note 78, at 582, app. II.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, at art.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 100, at art. 19.
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And the third principle, recognizing the importance of free
and accessible mass media to freedom of expression and
information, is reflected in the final wording, which guaranteed the
flow of information “through any media.” Given that mass media
was understood as essential to carrying information and ideas
across the globe, the nod to “regardless of frontiers” is also a nod to
mass media and its essential role in the project of free expression
and information.
These essential principles of the Free Flow of Information
Paradigm, in which the language and understanding of the
freedom to “seek, receive, and impart information” was forged, are
thus also essential to understanding the rights to Internet access
articulated in the Report.
Moreover, the fact that the Special Rapporteur, who is a
human rights lawyer from Guatemala, based his findings on
Internet access rights primarily on Article 19 of the ICCPR, which
codifies the principles of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm,
has even more significance today, because since the apex of the
Free Flow of Information Paradigm, a new competing paradigm
concerning the international law and politics of media,
information, and expression has emerged. And that paradigm
arose among both Third World and developing countries in the
“south,” like Guatemala, and is oriented more toward their issues
117
and challenges.
3.

A New Competing Paradigm

The Free Flow of Information Paradigm, largely advocated by
the United States and other Western countries, remained
influential at the international level for decades after the Post-War
118
However, by the 1970s, a new paradigm began to emerge
years.
to challenge its predominance, and UNESCO would be the main
119
“battleground” in which these competing paradigms would clash.
117. See FREDERICK H. GAREAU, THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 129 (2002) (discussing how the promoters and
advocates of a New World Information and Communication Order in the 1980s
were attempting to champion the cause of Guatemala, which was concerned about
how Western TV programming was putting its “culture at risk”). For information
about Frank La Rue’s home country origins, see Biography: Frank La Rue, UNITED
STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/bio
/?content=rue_frank (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
118. Cate, supra note 51, at 373–75 (noting the paradigm went “virtually
unchallenged” before the 1960s); see also HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 173.
119. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 173; Ayish, supra note 51, at 490–93; Cate,
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The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies—who saw
freedom of information as a threat to their security, as well as a
powerful tool of Western influence—were the first to challenge the
ideas of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm in the 1960s, but
largely failed to gain any kind of international consensus or
120
traction for their own ideas or proposals. Rather, it was a related
but different movement driven largely by Third World countries,
which gained much more international momentum in the 1970s.
The role and participation of Third World nations in international
politics grew throughout the 1960s, and by the end of that decade,
these countries focused on what they perceived as an “imbalance”
in global mass communications between wealthier and poorer
121
countries.
This emerging paradigm rejected the unrestricted flow of free
information and instead advocated state regulation of information
and expression to guarantee more “balance” and to achieve certain
122
These ideas were reflected
social, political, and economic goals.
in the movement’s notable call for a “New World Information and
Communication Order” or NWICO, which was essentially a
123
And while the NWICO movement
collection of proposals.
originated among Third World countries, some of its proposals on
issues of media concentration and monopoly did gain support from
124
other countries, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
supra note 51, at 375–81; Gauhar, supra note 60, at 55–58; Stephen Raube-Wilson,
The New World Information and Communication Order and International Human Rights
Law, 9 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 107, 107–12 (1986) (describing the ongoing
NWICO debate in UNESCO); Colleen Roach, The Movement for a New World
Information and Communication Order: A Second Wave?, 12 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y
283, 283–85 (1990); William Fitzmaurice, Note, The New World Information and
Communication Order: Is the International Programme for the Development of
Communication the Answer?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 953, 953–70 (1982–1983)
(describing the various paradigms debated in UNESCO).
120. Cate, supra note 51, at 375–81; Gauhar, supra note 60, at 55–56.
121. Ayish, supra note 51, at 492–93; Cate, supra note 51, at 375–76; RaubeWilson, supra note 119, at 107–09. See generally Fitzmaurice, supra note 119
(discussing the international communication imbalance and a New World
Information and Communication Order as the appropriate solution).
122. Ayish, supra note 51, at 492; Cate, supra note 51, at 375–76; Raube-Wilson,
supra note 119, at 107–08.
123. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 119, at 954–55; Raube-Wilson, supra note 119,
at 107–08. The term is largely attributed to Tunisian UNESCO delegate and
MacBride Commission member Mustapha Masmoudi. See Cate, supra note 51, at
377.
124. See Gough Whitlam, Living with the United States—British Dominions and New
Pacific States, 1991 AUSTL. INT’L L. NEWS 59, 63–64 (noting that NWICO proposals
received support at times from various countries, including Australia, Canada, and
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Still, the United States and many Western countries saw
similarities between the NWICO movement’s criticisms of the free
flow doctrine and those of the Soviets, and thus saw it as a threat to
125
Throughout the
freedom of information and free expression.
1970s, UNESCO became the battleground in which the ideals and
126
The NWICO
principles of these competing paradigms clashed.
movement would reach its apex in the early 1980s, with UNESCO’s
release of the MacBride Commission Report on a “New World
127
Though the report
Information and Communication Order.”
did not adopt the more radical NWICO proposals, it did endorse
many of the movement’s ideas—including recommending
regulations on media to promote certain “social, cultural,
128
Despite its more moderate
economic and political goals.”
proposals, the MacBride Commission Report proved controversial,
leading the United States, which viewed the report as an attack on
press freedom and the free flow of information, to withhold
funding for UNESCO in 1982 and withdraw from the agency in
129
1984.
Of course, in the context of these developments, the Free Flow
of Information Paradigm and Article 19, did not fade into the
background.
It, too, remained as an important competing
paradigm. In fact, the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC)
would issue a General Comment interpreting Article 19 of the
ICCPR around the time that NWICO was gaining international
130
support, reaffirming the free flow paradigmatic principles.
Before 1992, when the HRC began issuing specific comments on
the various reports submitted by individual countries concerning
their ICCPR compliance, the HRC’s General Comments were
widely published as essential materials for interpreting the meaning
New Zealand).
125. See Cate, supra note 51, at 388–90; Gauhar, supra note 60, at 56–57; RaubeWilson, supra note 119, at 108–09; Roach, supra note 119, at 284–85.
126. Ayish, supra note 51, at 492–93; Gauhar, supra note 60, at 56; RaubeWilson, supra note 119, at 107–09.
127. Ayish, supra note 51, at 493; Cate, supra note 51, at 384; Raube-Wilson,
supra note 119, at 107–08.
128. Ayish, supra note 51, at 493; Cate, supra note 51, at 385; Raube-Wilson,
supra note 119, at 107–08.
129. Ayish, supra note 51, at 493–94; Cate, supra note 51, at 388–92; RaubeWilson, supra note 119, at 107–08.
130. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment
No. 10: Freedom of Expression, art. 19, (June 29, 1983) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 10], http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)
/2bb2f14bf558182ac12563ed0048df17?Opendocument.
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131

and scope of articles in the ICCPR.
The General Comment
stated:
Paragraph 2 requires protection of the right to freedom of
expression, which includes not only freedom to “impart
information and ideas of all kinds,” but also freedom to
“seek” and “receive” them “regardless of frontiers” and in
whatever medium, “either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.” Not all States parties have provided information
concerning all aspects of the freedom of expression. For
instance, little attention has so far been given to the fact
that, because of the development of modern mass media,
effective measures are necessary to prevent such control
of the media as would interfere with the right of everyone
to freedom of expression in a way that is not provided for
132
in paragraph 3.
The General Comment’s interpretation of Article 19 of the ICCPR
itself reflects many of the principles and ideas of the Free Flow of
Information Paradigm: the importance of the free flow of
information and free and accessible mass media.
So, when the Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue set out to
explore the Internet rights in his Report, there was this broader
background of competing paradigms from which to draw ideas.
And, no doubt, he was likely aware of the NWICO paradigm
because of a recent publication to which he contributed that
133
discussed its development.
In articulating the nature and dimensions of Internet access
rights and how they are threatened, the Special Rapporteur could
131. FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN & STEPHEN J. SCHNABLY, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES, CASES AND ANALYSIS 204 (2006)
(noting that HRC comments are persuasive, but not binding authorities for
interpreting the ICCPR); Shiyan Sun, The Understanding and Interpretation of the
ICCPR in the Context of China’s Possible Ratification, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 17, 25
(2007) (discussing General Comments as the “second most important basis” for
interpreting the ICCPR, after the text itself).
132. General Comment No. 10, supra note 130.
133. See Guy Berger, What Africa Tells Us About Access to Information, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION: THE RIGHT TO KNOW 86, 86 (2010), http://unesdoc.unesco.org
/images/0019/001936/193653e.pdf (“However, this third phase was also a period
that coincided with the New World Information Order initiative, which lent itself
to legitimising state ownership and control. As new regimes became entrenched
in the 1970s and 1980s, so this “development” media became increasingly another
kind of tool—i.e. one that was wielded to maintain political control. This meant a
constriction and perversion of information, resulting in low volume, low value and
low credibility information—in worst cases, hagiographic nonsense about the daily
activities of the head of state.”).
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have drawn on the NWICO paradigm and its ideas, which oriented
concerns about freedom of information towards more social and
economic aims, including media ownership and monopolies. The
central thrust of NWICO was, after all, about promoting state
regulation of media, rather than telling states to keep hands off, to
allow access to ideas and the mediums through which they could be
134
communicated.
But it was not the principles of NWICO that defined the
Report’s notion of Internet access rights. There was no mention of
the MacBride Commission Report, no mention of UNESCO, and
no mention of the need to regulate for monopolies or for a greater
role for states. To the contrary, the main theme of the Report is
that states constitute a great threat to the free flow of ideas of
information and Internet freedom, and steps must be taken to
address that threat and curtail the increasing regulation and
135
Thus, Article 19(2) and its
censorship of the Internet by states.
broader historical context and principles formed the central
foundation of the Special Rapporteur’s grand declaration
concerning Internet access rights.
IV. READING THE REPORT IN LIGHT OF THE FREE FLOW OF
INFORMATION PARADIGM
The previous section traced the origins of the ideas embodied
in Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, and the Free Flow of Information
Paradigm’s ideas that it codified. This paradigm’s influence is seen
in several aspects of the Report, and the conception of Internet
access rights it discusses.
The first principle of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm,
which conceptualized freedom of information as a fundamental or
foundational freedom tied to expression, is apparent throughout
the Report. Right from the very beginning, the Special Rapporteur
links the “right to freedom of opinion and expression,” to the right
to “seek, receive, and impart information” through the “Internet”;
and in sections where the importance of the Internet as a medium
for the “exchange [of] information and ideas” is linked to its
capacity as a “key means” for the exercise of the right to “freedom
136
of opinion and expression.”
The second principle, which emphasized the “free flow” of
134.
135.
136.

See supra text accompanying notes 122–30.
See Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 1.
Id. at 1, 6–7 (emphasis added).
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information, is also apparent throughout the Report. In fact, the
importance to promote, or protect, the “free flow of information” is
137
And, in the Report’s
discussed several times in the Report.
recommendations, the Special Rapporteur held that:
[T]here should be as little restriction as possible to the
flow of information via the Internet, except in few,
exceptional, and limited circumstances prescribed by
international human rights law. He also stresses that the
full guarantee of the right to freedom of expression must
be the norm, and any limitation considered as an
exception, and that this principle should never be
reversed. Against this backdrop, the Special Rapporteur
138
recommends the steps set out below.
This is a fairly clear and unmistakable affirmation of the “free flow
of information” principle, which arises from Article 19(2)’s
language, and its history and origins in the Free Flow of
139
Information Paradigm.
And the third Free Flow of Information Paradigm principle,
which recognized the importance of free and accessible mass
media to freedom of expression and information, is not only
explicitly and implicitly invoked over and over again in the Report,
it is reflected by the central finding of the Report itself: that the
Internet is essential to Article 19’s right of expression and the right
to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas. For example,
early on, the Special Rapporteur recognizes the power of the
Internet in contemporary society:
The Special Rapporteur believes that the Internet is one
of the most powerful instruments of the 21st century for
increasing transparency in the conduct of the powerful,
access to information, and for facilitating active citizen
participation in building democratic societies. Indeed,
the recent wave of demonstrations in countries across the
Middle East and North African region has shown the key
role that the Internet can play in mobilizing the
population to call for justice, equality, accountability and
better respect for human rights. As such, facilitating
access to the Internet for all individuals, with as little
restriction to online content as possible, should be a

137. Id. at 4, 13, 15, 19, 22.
138. Id. at 19.
139. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, at
art. 19(2).
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140

priority for all States.
From there, the Report goes on to link the Internet’s powerful
impact to the importance of freedom of expression and the
exchange of ideas:
Very few if any developments in information technologies
have had such a revolutionary effect as the creation of the
Internet. Unlike any other medium of communication,
such as radio, television and printed publications based
on one-way transmission of information, the Internet
represents a significant leap forward as an interactive
medium . . . . Such platforms are particularly valuable in
countries where there is no independent media, as they
enable individuals to share critical views and to find
objective information.
Furthermore, producers of
traditional media can also use the Internet to greatly
expand their audiences at nominal cost. More generally,
by enabling individuals to exchange information and
ideas instantaneously and inexpensively across national
borders, the Internet allows access to information and
knowledge that was previously unattainable. This, in turn,
contributes to the discovery of the truth and progress of
141
society as a whole.
After noting the importance of the Internet in its role as a medium
of ideas and information, the Special Rapporteur finds that the
Internet has become a “key means” for people to “exercise their
right to freedom of opinion and expression, as guaranteed by
142
This, I would argue, constitutes a rather clear
[A]rticle 19 . . . .”
affirmation, or reflection, of this third central tenet of the Free
Flow of Information Paradigm. All of the paradigm’s principles are
reflected in the Report, in many of its findings.
A final observation should be made. Earlier, I talked about
Internet rights in both negative and positive terms; the former
concerned restricting state intervention on access rights, while the
positive component concerned positive obligations the state might
have to actively provide people with the means to access the
Internet. That is, where people might not have Internet access, the
state would have to take steps to provide the infrastructure for that
connectivity. The Report (as I noted much earlier) talks primarily
about Internet access rights in negative terms; about the many ways
that states are restricting people’s access to the Internet, and its
140.
141.
142.

Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 4.
Id. at 6–7
Id.
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content, by way of filtering, censoring, criminalizing expression,
143
The Report does talk
intermediary liability, and cyber-attacks.
somewhat about the physical infrastructure needed for Internet
access, and state obligations surrounding it, but its
recommendations on these points amount mainly to a “call” for
states to develop strategies to build Internet infrastructure, and
more wealthy companies to “honour” their commitment to help
144
But, there are only a
underdeveloped countries to do so.
handful of recommendations on these points, compared to the
lengthy ones on dealing with state restrictions on Internet access
145
and its content.
Interestingly, the Free Flow of Information Paradigm, as
noted, was similarly negative in orientation; it was concerned mainly
with promoting the unrestricted flow of information and ideas
internationally and across borders, and limiting state restrictions on
media and mediums. Other than recognizing the importance of
communication mediums to freedom of information and
expression, it never resolutely imposed positive state obligations to
provide people with the means or mediums to communicate. In
other words, the general orientation of the Free Flow of
Information Paradigm is also reflected in the overall orientation of
the Report, articulating a conception of Internet access rights that
is mainly negative in application and focus.
V. INTERNET RIGHTS: FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In the end, this paradigm of thought on information law and
principles, codified in Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, constitutes the
intellectual origins and the broader historical context of the
concept of rights set out by the Report. Without this context, it is
impossible to understand where these ideas came from, and,
arguably, where ideas about Internet or information and
communication rights will ultimately go in the years ahead. In this
section, I discuss some potential future directions in light of this
groundbreaking Report. What are some of its implications?
First, the Report will likely have some impact in national legal
jurisdictions around the world, where courts may adopt its
143. See id. at 1.
144. Id. at 22.
145. Compare id. at 9–16 (discussing at length the “[r]estriction of content on
the Internet,” which includes arbitrary blocking and filtering, criminalization of
legitimate expression, intermediary liability, and cyber-attacks), with id. at 16–19
(discussing briefly access to “necessary infrastructure”).
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reasoning when making legal rulings about people’s access to the
Internet, and government regulation of access and content. Of
course, how much influence will depend upon the legal systems in
question, and the legal culture those systems foster, but a clear
declaration from a high profile U.N. adjudicative official like the
Special Rapporteur will not go unnoticed, particularly given the
global attention it received when the Report was released.
Second, the Report may also have a political impact. I noted
earlier that the Report mainly discussed restrictions on Internet
access rights; in making the finding of Internet access as a
fundamental human right, the Report may still push governments
to take positive steps to provide broader and better Internet access
for populations. Indeed, there are real world legislative models in
countries like Finland and Estonia, who are leading the way with
statutory schemes guaranteeing citizen access to the Internet. The
Report may, ultimately, foster public support for similar legislation
in other jurisdictions.
Finally, given that the notion of Internet access rights set out
in the Report is grounded in a longer, and continually evolving
movement of ideas about information flow and communication
rights, it is unlikely that this is a passing legal phase or fad; and the
scope and basis for such rights claims will likely only broaden and
strengthen with time, particularly as Internet use is integrated more
and more in the daily lives of people around the world. And,
indeed, this is linked to my purpose in undertaking this
exploration. I have attempted to show, first and foremost, that the
Report was not a surprising anomaly, nor did its ideas arise out of a
vacuum; but that they arise, and can only be understood, within a
broader historical and legal context. I hope that I have persuaded,
or at least provided a persuasive foundation, for further study of
these ideas and their origins.
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